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Abstract— Starting with data obtained from human-subject 
experiments to investigate farmers’ responses to a 
conservation incentive scheme, we derive a cognitive model 
of the farmers’ decision-making behaviour, and implement 
this model within an agent-based simulation of farmers 
interacting via different types of social network.  We find 
that the outcome of the scheme in early time periods is 
improved by providing more information to farmers. 
However, changing the structure of the social network by 
which the information is provided has no effect. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS abstract contributes to the literature on the use of 
agent based simulation modeling to study the pattern of 
land use behaviour on privately owned geographical 
landscapes, specifically agricultural landscapes. Such 
landscapes deliver ecosystem services that are beneficial for 
mankind (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report 2005), 
including food and water provision, flood control, insect 
pollination services for crop cultivation, water quality 
maintenance and habitat and biodiversity protection. Land 
use behaviour pertaining to the provision of these ecosystem 
services is commonly incentivized with the help of 
conservation incentive schemes termed Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) Schemes. These schemes entail 
financial compensation for private landowners, most 
commonly farmers, who adopt pro-conservation land uses 
on their property. The economic rationale behind such funds 
transfer is that many ecosystem services have public good 
features, leading to their under-provision by the private 
agent – thus increase in supply can be potentially affected by 
making targeted payments to farmers. Another rationale for 
these payments is that since the ecosystem services provided 
by the farmers have benefits for society, farmers should be 
compensated for producing these benefits. Examples of PES 
schemes include the Stewardship Scheme in the UK (Dobbs 
and Pretty 2004), the Conservation Reserve Program in the 
US (Ferris and Siikamäki 2009) and the Pago por Servicios 
Ambientales (PSA) in Costa Rica (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 
2007). 
In the domain of PES schemes, one issue that has received 
widespread attention is that adopting the same land use on 
parcels of neighbouring farms, or on parcels within a given 
distance of each other, can increase the delivery of many 
ecosystem services which have positive spatial synergies 
(Margules and Pressey 2000). The economic literature by 
Parkhurst et al. (2007), Warziniack et al. (2007), Watzold et 
al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2012 & 2014) has focused on 
the study of the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) subsidy, that 
incentivizes such spatially coordinated land use behaviour 
by neighbouring landowners. The AB is a two-part payment 
scheme with a base payment and a bonus contingent on 
spatial coordination of land uses by neighbours. In this 
format the AB takes the form of a coordination game with 
multiple Nash equilibria, each corresponding to a particular 
land use strategy, ranked in terms of their payoffs – under 
one Nash equilibrium situation, participants make more 
money than under the other. This is the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium. However, depending upon the payoffs, the 
equilibrium selection principle of risk dominance (Harsanyi 
and Selten 1988) may select equilibria other than the Pareto 
efficient one, resulting in coordination failure. Previous 
experimental work has analyzed performance of the AB 
scheme and coordination failure under various conditions 
such as repeated interactions with neighbouring farmers, or 
the possibility of communication before making land use 
decisions (Parkhurst and Shogren 2007; Warziniack et al 
2007).  
Banerjee et al. (2012, 2014) focus on behaviour on simple 
local networks where every farmer has two neighbours 
whose actions determine whether they receive AB bonus 
payments or not. Laboratory experiments are used to explore 
the performance of the AB scheme in achieving cooperation 
amongst farmers over repeated periods of strategic 
interaction. In this paper we build upon these experimental 
results, first by extracting from them a cognitive model of 
the farmers’ decision-making behaviour in response to the 
scheme, and then by using agent-based simulation to 
investigate how the performance of the AB scheme is 
affected by the amount of information available to farmers 
and the source from which this information is received. Our 
model adds to the large body of agent-based modelling 
literature focusing on the study of land use change and 
decision making under various economic settings as 
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applicable to environmental management and conservation 
(Berger 2001; Filatova et al.; Ng et al. 2011). We also 
contribute to the growing body of work on combining agent-
based modeling with human-subject experimentation (Duffy 
2006). 
Our cognitive model combines imitative learning (Eshel 
et al. 1998) and myopic best response (Morris 2000), along 
with force of habit (Blume 1993, Kahneman 2003) and a 
non-specific, time-dependent learning effect. Simulations 
using this model show that giving farmers more information 
about other farmers’ choices and payoffs leads to higher 
levels of cooperation during early periods.  However, 
changing the source of that information – whether it comes 
from local neighbours only or from long-range contacts in a 
small world network – has no effect on cooperation levels. 
II. METHODS 
A. Experimental data 
 
Fig. 1. Network structure in human subject experiments. The 
geographical network (solid lines) is a ring of 12 farmers. The 
information network is either a ring (solid lines only) or a ring lattice 
(solid and broken lines). Squares represent subjects adopting strategy 
M and circles represent subjects adopting strategy K. 
 
The starting point of our work is data from human subject 
experiments by Banerjee et al. (2014). These experiments 
considered networks of 12 subjects representing farmers 
arranged geographically on a ring, as pictured in Figure 1. 
Each subject on this network is geographically adjacent to 
two neighbours, one on the left and one on the right, termed 
direct neighbours. From a conservation perspective a ring 
network is useful as it is representative of many 
geographical landscapes, such as riparian landscapes, but 
removes potential sources of confounding due to edge 
effects. Experiments lasted for 30 periods. During a period, 
each subject was asked to choose between two alternative 
strategies, M (the “efficient, cooperative” choice) and K (the 
“inefficient” choice), represented as green squares and red 
circles, respectively, in the figure. Subjects were provided 
with a payoff table (Table 1) informing them of the payoffs 
they would receive for each choice, depending upon the 
choices of their direct neighbours in the same period. For 
example, subject 1 in Figure 1 receives a payoff of 60 (the 
player’s choice is K and the neighbours’ choices are MM). 
In each period, subjects are informed of certain other 
subjects’ choices and payoffs in the previous period. In one 
treatment, this information comes from directly linked 
neighbours only. In a second treatment, the information also 
comes from indirect neighbours, who are the direct 
neighbours of the subject’s two direct neighbours on both 
sides (pictured as broken lines in Fig 1).  
Experiments were carried out during 12 sessions (6 for 
each treatment), with 12 participants at each session. The 
experimental data (see for example, Figure 4) shows a 
relatively high initial level of cooperation which declines 
steadily over time. 
 
B. Cognitive model 
Many models of human decision making in iterated 
strategic interactions have been proposed in the literature. 
Myopic best response (Morris 2000) models cognitively 
sophisticated agents capable of strategic thinking. In this 
model, an agent’s choice for the current period is the 
strategy that is the best response to the situation faced in the 
previous period. So for example, subject 1 in Figure 1 will 
choose strategy M in the next period, as that is the best 
response to the situation  where both neighbours (subjects 2 
and 12) having chosen M previously will do so in the current 
period as well. 
Imitation (Eshel et al. 1998) is an alternative model which 
requires less cognitive ability on the part of agents. In this 
model, an agent simply considers the strategies and payoffs 
of its neighbours from the previous period, and copies the 
most rewarding strategy in the current period. Force of habit 
(Blume 1993, Kahneman 2003) is an even simpler model 
that captures the fact that human beings are cognitively 
sluggish and tend to repeat the same behaviour even when it 
might be in their economic interest to change. 
Our cognitive model combines myopic best response, 
imitation, and force of habit, together with a period term 
intended to capture other, non-specific forms of learning 
over time that might take place (for example, growing 
apathy or cynicism leading to reduced willingness to 
cooperate). The model was derived by applying logistic 
regression to the strategic choices of the human subjects in 
experiments. The model gives the probability (p) that an 
agent will choose strategy M in the next period. The model 
includes three binary predictors, representing whether 
strategy M is the choice predicted by myopic best response 
(MBR), imitation (Imit), and force of habit (Habit), 
respectively. The time period (t) is the final predictor.  Table 
2 shows the details of the statistical analysis. The estimated 
regression equation is: 
TABLE I. 
PAYOFFS IN THE AGGLOMERATION BONUS GAME 
 Direct neighbors’ choices 
Landowner choice MM MK KK 
M 90 50 10 
K 60 70 80 
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C. ABM dynamics 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flow diagram for a single agent i. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the logic followed by a single agent i in 
the simulation. Initially, the agent will randomly select either 
strategy M or K, with a probability of 0.68 of choosing M. 
This probability reflects the proportion of times M was 
chosen by the experimental subjects in the initial period. The 
payoffs for the current period are then calculated. The 
strategies chosen by direct neighbours are examined and 
used to calculate the myopic best response prediction for the 
next period. The strategies and outcomes for all social 
contacts are examined and used to calculate the imitation-
based prediction for the next period. Finally, these 
predictions are fed into the cognitive model equation, 
yielding a probability pit(M) that agent i will select M in the 
next period t, and the agent randomly chooses a strategy 
according to this probability. 
D. Social network treatments 
The literature on community natural resource 
management (Bodin et al. 2009; Prell et al. 2009) suggests 
that social networks within farming communities play an 
instrumental role in determining the success of natural 
resource management initiatives. In our model, the social 
network acts as the source of information about other 
farmers’ strategic choices and consequent payoffs. We 
consider the impact of varying two aspects of these social 
networks 1) the number of social contacts per agent, which 
determines the amount of information the agent receives, 
and 2) the topology of the network.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Geographical network of a ring of 12 farmers with two different 
social networks. Solid lines represent the geographical network; solid and 
broken lines represent the social network. Top: regular social network 
where each agent has exactly 6 local contacts. Bottom: small world social 
network where each agent has on average 6 contacts which may be local or 
long-range. 
TABLE 2. 
STATISTICAL DERIVATION OF THE COGNITIVE MODEL 
Random-effects logistic regression 
Number of observations: 4176 
Number of agents: 144   (exactly 29 observations per group) 
Random effects ui ~ Gaussian 
Wald chi2(4) = 929.18                      Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
 Coef Std Err z 
P > 
[z] 
[95% conf. 
int.] 
MBR 2.83 0.20 14.16 0.00 2.44 3.22 
Imit 0.69 0.17 4.15 0.00 0.36 1.02 
Habit 2.88 0.17 17.26 0.00 2.56 3.21 
t -0.05 0.01 -5.39 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 
constant -2.42 0.20 -11.97 0.00 -2.82 -2.03 
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Agents may receive information, not only from their two 
direct, geographical neighbours, but also from indirect 
neighbours, a situation referred to as information spillover. 
To study the impact of the amount of information received, 
we consider a range of information spillover setups, starting 
from the minimum setup where an agent’s only social 
contacts are its two geographical/direct neighbours, to one in 
which the social network is a fully-connected clique. Figure 
1 and Figure 3 (top) show two points on this range, 
illustrating the cases where each agent has, respectively, 4 
and 6 social contacts. The social networks in this study are 
regular networks, of a ring-lattice type, with varying degree. 
To study the impact of the network topology, we begin 
with the regular social networks of the previous stage, and 
rewire some of the links by replacing them with random 
links. The effect of rewiring is to replace some local links 
with long-range links. This reduces the diameter of the 
network, allowing information to flow more quickly 
between nodes that are geographically distant. The resulting 
networks have the small-world property, which has been 
observed in many real world social networks (Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998) and has been found to influence the 
dynamics of many processes that take place on those 
networks, e.g., epidemic spread and control (Maharaj and 
Kleczkowski, 2012). By varying the probability of rewiring, 
we create a range of social networks, from ones with only 
local links (Figure 3, top), to small world networks (Figure 
3, bottom), up to fully random networks. (We note that 
rewiring, as implemented in our model, may cause links with 
direct neighbours to be lost, which is arguably unrealistic). 
III. RESULTS 
A. Comparison of cognitive model with experimental data 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of the experimental data 
with simulations using our cognitive model with the same 
geographical and social network setups used in the 
experiments. Here, the information network is a ring lattice, 
as shown in Figure 1. We also show the results of simulating 
two simpler cognitive models: pure myopic best response 
and pure imitation. As the figure shows, neither of the 
simpler models yields results that resemble the experimental 
data, therefore it seems likely that the cognitive process 
employed by experimental subjects is more complicated than 
either of these. As a measure of model fit we can use the 
sum of squared differences between the model result and the 
experimental result at each time step. The imitation model 
scores 142471 and the myopic best response model scores 
23938. Our cognitive model, which combines these simple 
models with force of habit and a non-specific time-
dependent learning effect, captures the behaviour of the 
experimental subjects better, particularly in the early 
periods, having the best score (10737). The correspondence 
between the model and the experimental data is even better 
in the case of the simple ring network (not shown). 
 
Fig.  4  Comparison of experimental data with simulations of myopic 
best response, imitation, and the combined model. The figure shows the 
percentage of cooperation (M choices) by period. The geographical and 
information networks are as in Figure 1. Simulation results show the 
median of 1000 replicates. In all cases, the information network is a 
ring lattice (direct and indirect neighbours) as shown in Figure 1. 
B. Effect of information 
Figure 5 shows the results of increasing the amount of 
information available to agents.  In this figure, simulations 
are done on regular networks with local social contacts, of 
the form shown in Figure1 and Figure 3 (top). Our results 
indicate that given the current adverse payoff structure 
(whereby there is not much payoff difference between a 
player and neighbours choosing  M or K) on a local network, 
increasing the information available to agents increases their 
likelihood of efficient coordination in the short term but does 
not prevent the inefficient strategy from becoming 
contagious in the long run. Thus performance of AB-based 
PES schemes should consider mechanisms to ensure that the 
efficient outcome can be obtained in the presence of more 
information even if repeated interaction has a tendency to 
transition the system to the inefficient outcome.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Number of periods taken for the percentage of M choices to fall 
to 10% or less, against number of social contacts, in a regular network of 
100 nodes with local information. Each box represents 100 replicates. 
Increasing information leads to greater cooperation in early periods  
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Surprisingly, introducing long-range, non-local links into 
the social network has no effect on cooperation. Figure 6 
shows typical results. Here, the total number of links in the 
network is kept fixed at 200 (equivalent to a ring lattice as in 
Figure 1), but the probability of replacing a local link with a 
randomly chosen, possibly long-range link, is varied from 0 
to 1. The time taken for cooperation to drop below 10% is 
the same, regardless of the structure of the social network. 
(Note that the result for the case where there is no rewiring 
differs slightly from the equivalent case in Figure 5; this 
appears to be due to stochastic differences between the 
simulations used in the two figures.) 
 
Fig. 6. Number of periods taken for the percentage of M choices to fall 
to 10% or less, against rewiring probability, in a Watts-Strogatz information 
network of 100 nodes. Each box represents 100 replicates. Replacing local 
with long-range information has no effect on cooperation.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We evaluate spatial coordination of agents in an AB 
scheme when they are arranged on a ring and receive 
information about others’ actions through social networks of 
varying topologies. We find that additional information and 
network structure play only a limited role in maintaining 
efficient coordination over repeated periods of strategic 
interaction. Future research in this context may thus involve 
devising and testing different ways of preventing contagion 
of the inefficient action. One option would be to evaluate 
agent behaviour when the payoff difference between 
efficient and inefficient equilibria is much higher than what 
we consider. Another option is to explore whether 
information about AB scheme decisions from neighbouring 
communities can influence agents’ to coordinate efficiently. 
This is important since conservation agencies usually have 
access to this information that they can make available to 
farmers at minimal cost. Finally, noting that the network 
structure does not matter, it would be interesting to use a 
mean-field mathematical model to simulate behaviour and 
evaluate AB scheme outcomes.  
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